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Abstract
This paper studies an auction design problem for a seller to
sell a commodity in a social network, where each individual
(the seller or a buyer) can only communicate with her neigh-
bors. The challenge to the seller is to design a mechanism to
incentivize the buyers, who are aware of the auction, to fur-
ther propagate the information to their neighbors so that more
buyers will participate in the auction and hence, the seller
will be able to make a higher revenue. We propose a novel
auction mechanism, called information diffusion mechanism
(IDM), which incentivizes the buyers to not only truthfully re-
port their valuations on the commodity to the seller, but also
further propagate the auction information to all their neigh-
bors. In comparison, the direct extension of the well-known
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism in social networks
can also incentivize the information diffusion, but it will de-
crease the seller’s revenue or even lead to a deficit sometimes.
The formalization of the problem has not yet been addressed
in the literature of mechanism design and our solution is very
significant in the presence of large-scale online social net-
works.
Introduction
Mechanism design is a representative interface integrating
economics and artificial intelligence (Nisan et al. 2007). It
utilizes game theoretic tools to model interactions between
agents, and takes a systematic investigation of the design of
institutions and how these institutions affect the outcomes of
agents’ interactions. Auction has been a common paradigm
(Krishna 2009) and a successful application (Edelman and
Schwarz 2007; Bajari and Hortacsu 2003) in mechanism de-
sign. Although in almost every human-activated system, the
social network matters (Jackson 2008; Borgatti et al. 2009),
the standard auction theory only considers buyers who are
called together by the seller, while the effects of social links
connecting these buyers to other potential buyers who are
not known by the seller have not yet been explored. Without
an effective auction mechanism that facilitates information
propagation in the social network, a potential buyer with a
high valuation may not be aware of the auction since she
is not directly connected to the seller and her neighbors do
not wish to tell her the auction information. Therefore, in
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order to simultaneously improve the seller’s revenue and the
social welfare, which are two primary and generally con-
flicting objectives in any auction design (Myerson 1981;
Krishna and Perry 1998), it is of great importance to de-
sign auction mechanisms in social networks, which not only
satisfy the classical criteria such as incentive compatibility
and individual rationality, but also incentivize individuals to
spread the auction information in the social network.
The main difficulty for incentivizing the individuals to
spread the auction information lies in the general conflict
that the seller wishes to attract more people to participate in
the auction in order to increase her revenue, but participants
have no incentive to bring more competitors into the auc-
tion. This essentially reflects the conflict between the sys-
tem’s optimality and the individuals’ self-interests. Under
all classic auction protocols including the Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves (VCG) mechanism (Vickrey 1961; Clarke 1971;
Groves 1973), the seller can only convene a small amount
of people into the auction while the other potential buyers in
the social network are all excluded from the auction, even
though they may have higher valuations. As a result, the
seller’s revenue can only be locally optimized, or, the effi-
ciency (social welfare) can only be locally maximized.
The goal of this paper is to design mechanisms that can
improve both the efficiency and the seller’s revenue, which
is not achievable with existing mechanisms. To this end, we
propose a novel mechanism that incentivizes all participants
to further propagate the auction information, which will lead
to a more efficient allocation and more revenue to the seller.
The intuition behind this mechanism is that information dif-
fusion is rewarded if it leads to a more efficient allocation.
Our contributions advance the state of the art in the follow-
ing ways:
• We propose the very first model for selling one item in a
social network, where each participant in the network can
only communicate with her neighbors.
• In the network setting, we first show that the well-known
VCG mechanism can be extended to incentivize informa-
tion diffusion and therefore all potential buyers in the net-
work will join the auction to achieve the optimal social
welfare. However, it does not increase the revenue of the
seller and even leads to a deficit sometimes, which will
disincentivize the seller to apply such a mechanism.
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• Therefore, we propose another novel mechanism called
information diffusion mechanism (IDM) to solve the
deficit issue of the VCG. IDM not only incentivizes infor-
mation diffusion as the VCG does, but also brings more
revenue to the seller. In particular, the revenue generated
by IDM is always above the revenue created by the VCG
and it is non-negative.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We
first define the bidder’s actions and the seller’s revenue for
a single item auction in a social network, extend the clas-
sical incentive compatibility to the social network setting,
and then define some general concepts of an auction mech-
anism in such a framework. We then generalize the well-
known VCG mechanism into the social network setting and
analyze its performance. Following the weak performance
of the VCG, we propose our information diffusion mecha-
nism (IDM) and prove that it has a remarkable performance
compared to the VCG. Finally, we summarize this work and
discuss future work.
The Model
We consider a social network which consists of n agents
denoted by a set N = {1, · · · , n}. For each agent i ∈ N ,
she has a set of neighbors ri ⊆ N \ {i} with whom i can
directly exchange information (assume that ri 6= ∅). One
agent in this network, called the seller s, has an item to sell.
Each agent i ∈ N has a valuation vi ≥ 0 on the item. For the
seller s, vs represents her reserve price, which is assumed to
be zero in this paper. Initially, only the seller’s neighbors rs
know that s is selling the item.
Given the above setting, the goal of the seller is to get
more agents from the network to participate in the auction
and thus to maximize her revenue. Since the seller cannot
directly inform all agents other than rs, the challenge to her
is to build a mechanism to incentivize agents who have re-
ceived the auction information to further propagate the in-
formation to their neighbors, which has not yet been tackled
in the literature.
In this paper, the auction mechanism asks each agent to
both report her valuation on the item and to spread the auc-
tion information to her neighbors. Accordingly, an agent i’s
action in the mechanism is defined as a′i = (v
′
i, r
′
i), where v
′
i
represents the valuation she reports and r′i ⊆ ri represents
the neighbors to whom she tells the auction information. Let
ai = (vi, ri) denote the truthful action that i truthfully de-
clares her valuation and informs the auction information to
all her neighbors. We assume that once an agent received
the auction information, she will be able to participate in the
auction by reporting her valuation and further spreading the
auction information.
Let Ai = Vi ×P(ri) ∪ {null} be i’s action space, where
Vi is i’s valuation space, P(ri) is the power set of ri and
null is a dummy action for i when i has not received the
auction information or i does not want to participate in the
auction. Let N−s = N \ {s}, a′ = (a′i ∈ Ai)i∈N−s be an
action profile of all buyers, a′−i be the action profile of all
buyers except i and a′ = (a′i,a
′−i).
Definition 1. We say an action profile a′ is feasible if
a′i = null for all i ∈ N−s who cannot receive the auction
information following the actions of the others.
Let A be the set of all feasible action profiles of all buy-
ers N−s, and A
a′i
−i = {a′−i|(a′i,a′−i) ∈ A} be the set of
all feasible action profiles of all buyers except i given that
i’s action is a′i. Given any non-feasible action profile a
′, we
define a function f that transforms a′ to a feasible action
profile f(a′) = a′′ ∈ A, where
a′′i =
{
a′i if i receives the information following a
′−i,
null otherwise.
Given the buyers’ action profile, we formally define the
auction mechanism and the related concepts in the rest of
this section.
Definition 2. An auction mechanism M in the social net-
work is defined by an allocation policy pi = {pii}i∈N−s and
a payment policy p = {pi}i∈N−s , where pii : A → {0, 1}
and pi : A → R are the allocation and payment functions
for i respectively.
Given the buyers’ feasible action profile a′, pii(a′) = 1
means that i receives the item, while pii(a′) = 0 means that
i does not receive the item. pi(a′) ≥ 0 indicates that i pays
the auctioneer pi(a′), and i receives |pi(a′)| from the auc-
tioneer if pi(a′) < 0. We say an allocation policy pi is fea-
sible if for all a′ ∈ A, ∑i∈N−s pii(a′) ≤ 1, and pii(a′) = 1
implies a′i 6= null. That is, a feasible allocation can only
allocate the item to at most one buyer who has participated
in the auction. In what follows, we only consider feasible
allocations.
Definition 3. An allocation pi is efficient if for all a′ ∈ A,
pi ∈ arg maxpi′∈Π
∑
i∈N−s,a′i 6=null
pi′i(a
′)v′i
where Π is the set of all feasible allocations.
Given a buyer i of truthful action ai = (vi, ri), a feasible
action profile a′ and a mechanismM = (pi, p), the utility of
i under the allocation pi(a′) and the payment p(a′) is quasi-
linear and is defined as:
ui(ai,a
′, (pi, p)) = pii(a′)vi − pi(a′).
We say a mechanism is individually rational if for each
buyer, her utility is non-negative when she truthfully reports
her valuation, no matter to whom she tells the auction infor-
mation and what the others do.
Definition 4. A mechanism (pi, p) is individually rational
(IR) if ui(ai, ((vi, r′i),a
′
−i), (pi, p)) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N−s, all
r′i ∈ P(ri), and all a′−i ∈ A(vi,r
′
i)
−i .
Another concept is called incentive compatibility or truth-
fulness. In a traditional auction setting where a seller sells
a commodity to multiple buyers, incentive compatibility
means that for each buyer, reporting her valuation on the
commodity truthfully is a dominant strategy. However, in
our model, auction information diffusion is also considered.
Here, incentive compatibility means that for each buyer, re-
porting her true valuation and diffusing the auction informa-
tion to all her neighbors is a dominant strategy.
Definition 5. A mechanism (pi, p) is incentive compatible
(IC) if ui(ai, (ai,a′−i), (pi, p)) ≥ ui(ai, (a′i,a′′−i), (pi, p))
for all i ∈ N−s, all a′i ∈ Ai, and all a′−i ∈ Aai−i, where
(a′i,a
′′
−i) = f(a
′
i,a
′
−i).
Note that in this definition, a′−i is changed to a
′′
−i when i’s
action is changed from ai to a′i. This is because if an action
a′i does not spread the auction information to all i’s neigh-
bors, then some buyers, who receive the information under
ai, may not be able to receive the information under a′i. That
is, although (ai,a′−i) is a feasible action profile, it does not
guarantee that (a′i,a
′
−i) is also feasible. Therefore, in the IC
definition, we apply the function f to get the corresponding
feasible action profile of the other buyers when i’s action is
changed.
Given a feasible action profile a′ and a mechanismM =
(pi, p), the seller’s revenue generated by M is defined by
the sum of all buyers’ payments, denoted by RevM(a′) =∑
i∈N−s pi(a
′).
Definition 6. A mechanism M = (pi, p) is weakly budget
balanced if for all a′ ∈ A, RevM(a′) ≥ 0.
In the rest of this paper, we design mechanisms that sat-
isfy the above concepts. Before doing so, we will introduce
an important concept related to auction information diffu-
sion, called diffusion critical node.
Definition 7. Given the buyers’ feasible action profile a′,
for any two buyers i 6= j ∈ N−s such that a′i, a′j 6= null,
we say i is j’s diffusion critical node if all the information
diffusion paths started from the seller s to j have to pass i.
Intuitively, if i is j’s diffusion critical node under the ac-
tion profile a′, j will not be able to receive the auction infor-
mation if i has not propagated the information to her neigh-
bors. Note that, a buyer j may have no diffusion critical node
(e.g. the seller’s neighbors) or more than one diffusion crit-
ical nodes. Diffusion critical nodes will play a vital role in
the mechanisms proposed in the paper.
VCG in Social Networks
Given the social network and the extended definition of in-
centive compatibility, we will first check whether traditional
incentive compatible mechanisms can be extended to incen-
tivize information diffusion. In this section, we implement
the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism
under the social network setting. We prove that although
VCG mechanism can incentivize information diffusion, it
will decrease the seller’s revenue and even lead to a deficit
sometimes.
The VCG mechanism applies an efficient allocation and
charges each participant the social welfare decrease of the
others caused by her participation (Vickrey 1961; Clarke
1971; Groves 1973). In a classical setting where a seller sells
one item to a set of buyers who are known to the seller in ad-
vance, the VCG mechanism allocates the item to the buyer
who has the highest bid (the winner) and charges the buyer
the second highest bid among all the buyers (also known as
the second price auction). The other buyers who do not re-
ceive the item will not pay or get anything. However, in a
social network setting, if a buyer does not get the item, but
she is the winner’s diffusion critical node, she will receive a
reward. This is because the winner will not be able to partic-
ipate in the auction if her diffusion critical buyer(s) does not
spread the information.
Formally, given the buyers’ action profile a′ ∈ A, for each
buyer i ∈ N−s such that a′i 6= null, let
si = {j ∈ N−s|i is j’s diffusion critical node}
denote the set of all buyers who share i as their diffusion
critical node, and let di = si ∪ {i}. If i does not participate
in the auction (i.e., i chooses a dummy action null), then all
buyers from si also cannot participate in the auction as they
will not be able to receive the auction information without i.
Let −di = N−s \ di and a′−di be the action profile of −di
in a′. It is evident that a′−di cannot be changed by i’s action.
Now the VCG mechanism allocates the item to the buyer
with the highest valuation report (i.e., an efficient allocation)
and the payment for each buyer i is defined as:
pvcgi (a
′) = W (a′−di)− (W (a′)− pi∗i (a′)v′i) (1)
where W (a′−di) =
∑
j∈−di,a′j 6=null pi
∗
j (a
′
−di)v
′
j , W (a
′) =∑
j∈N−s,a′j 6=null pi
∗
j (a
′)v′j , and pi
∗ is an efficient allocation.
In the VCG payment definition, the first term W (a′−di)
is the social welfare of the efficient allocation without i’s
participation, and the second term W (a′) − pi∗i (a′)v′i is the
social welfare of the efficient allocation minus i’s valuation
on the allocation (i.e. the social welfare of all buyers except i
on the efficient allocation). Therefore, the VCG payment for
i is the social welfare decrease of the other buyers caused by
i’s participation (it can be negative).
In what follows, we prove that the VCG mechanism is
individually rational and incentive compatible. Before do-
ing this, we show one property of di with respect to ri in
Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. Given the buyers’ action profile a′, for each
buyer i and for any r′i, r
′′
i ∈ P(ri), if r′i ⊆ r′′i , then the
corresponding di, denoted by d′i and d
′′
i , satisfy d
′
i ⊆ d′′i .
Proof. For all j 6= i ∈ d′i, we have that all the diffusion
paths to reach j have to pass i when i propagates the infor-
mation to r′i. When i changes the diffusion set from r
′
i to
r′′i , the old set of paths to reach j will not be affected and
new paths to reach j might be created, but all the new paths
have to pass i (as the other buyers’ actions have not been
changed). Therefore, we have d′i ⊆ d′′i .
Theorem 1. The VCG mechanism is individually rational
and incentive compatible.
Proof. Given all buyers’ true action profile a and their actual
action profile a′, buyer i’s utility under the VCG mechanism
(pi∗, pvcg) is ui(ai,a′, (pi∗, pvcg)) = pi∗i (a
′)vi − pvcgi (a′) =
W (a′) + pi∗i (a
′)(vi − v′i)−W (a′−di).
If buyer i reports her valuation truthfully (i.e. v′i = vi),
we get ui(ai,a′, (pi∗, pvcg)) = W (a′)−W (a′−di). It is ev-
ident that W (a′) ≥ W (a′−di) because the allocation pi∗ is
efficient. Therefore, i’s utility is non-negative when i reports
her valuation truthfully (no matter who she spreads the in-
formation to). That is, the VCG mechanism is individually
rational.
Now we prove that the VCG mechanism is incentive com-
patible. We will prove this by showing that:
1. For each buyer i, fixing r′i, i’s utility is maximized by
reporting vi truthfully.
2. For each buyer i, fixing v′i, i’s utility is maximized by
diffusing the auction information to all her neighbors ri.
Given that r′i is fixed (i.e. information diffusion is fixed),
the first step is the traditional IC property of the VCG, which
is proved by showing that (1) i’s payment does not depend
on i’s reported valuation v′i and (2) i’s utility is maximized
by reporting vi truthfully. Since the VCG is known to be
incentive compatible in this setting, we will omit the proof
here.
For the second step, since −di is not affected by i’s ac-
tion r′i, W (a
′−di) does not depend on r
′
i. By Lemma 1, we
get that diffusing to more neighbors will get more buyers
to participate in the auction, which will potentially increase
W (a′), the highest valuation among the participated buyers.
Therefore, for each buyer i, when v′i is fixed, diffusing the
auction information to all her neighbors ri maximizes her
utility W (a′) + pi∗i (a
′)(vi − v′i)−W (a′−di).
By proving the above two properties, we conclude that for
each buyer, reporting her valuation truthfully and diffusing
the information to all her neighbors is a dominant strategy,
i.e., the VCG is IC.
Proposition 1. The VCG mechanism is not weakly budget
balanced.
Proof. We prove this by example. Figure 1 shows a network
where the seller s and l buyers form a line and the seller
is located at one of the end points. Here, all buyers, except
the one located at the other end of the line, have a valua-
tion zero, and the only non-zero valuation is 1. Applying the
VCG on this setting, the buyer with valuation 1 receives the
item and her payment is zero. All the other buyers do not re-
ceive the item, but each of them will receive 1 according to
the payment policy, because without any of them, the buyer
with valuation 1 will not be able to participate in the auction.
Thus, the revenue of the seller is −(l − 1).
s 0 0 0 1
1 2 l -1 l
··· 
Figure 1: A line-structured social network for the proof of
Proposition 1.
By contrast, for the same setting given in Figure 1, if the
seller applies the second price auction (without diffusion in-
centive), then only one buyer near the seller participates in
the auction, and the seller’s revenue is zero. Therefore, the
seller would rather prefer the second price auction to the
VCG mechanism with information diffusion with respect to
her revenue. The reason for the seller to incentivize buyers
to spread the auction information is to obtain a higher rev-
enue, but the VCG mechanism cannot achieve this. Hence,
in the next section, we propose a novel solution which will
not only incentivize buyers to spread the information, but
also increase the seller’s revenue.
Information Diffusion Mechanism
In this section, to conquer the revenue issue of the VCG
mechanism in social networks, we design a mechanism that
is incentive compatible and also increases the seller’s rev-
enue (weakly budget balanced). Based on the notion of dif-
fusion critical node, we first give another definition of diffu-
sion critical sequence, which is a key element of our mech-
anism.
Definition 8. Given the buyers’ action profile a′, for each
i ∈ N−s, we define Ci = {x1, x2, · · · , xk, i} the diffusion
critical sequence of i, which is an ordered set of all diffusion
critical nodes of i and i itself and the order is determined by
the relation dx1 ⊃ dx2 ⊃, · · · ,⊃ dxk ⊃ di.
The diffusion critical sequence captures how the auction
information from the seller is propagated to buyer i through
its diffusion critical nodes. It is essentially a partial route of
all the information diffusion paths from the seller to buyer
i, which clearly shows to what extend each node in the se-
quence affects the information diffusion process. A node in
the sequence can only receive the auction information if all
nodes ordered above the node have received the information
and propagated to the next node in the sequence. It is not dif-
ficult to verify that, after the diffusion process, there exists
one and only one diffusion critical sequence for each buyer
participated in the auction.
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Figure 2: A social network example and the corresponding
information diffusion flow.
To further demonstrate the property of a buyer’s diffusion
critical sequence, we study an example given in Figure 2.
Figure 2(a) shows a simple social network, where each cir-
cle denotes an agent and the value (except s) inside each
circle is the agent’s valuation. The agent with value s de-
notes the seller and all the potential buyers are labelled by
A,B, · · · , L. The links between circles represent the neigh-
borhood relationship. Figure 2(b) shows the corresponding
directed graph of the information flow, where the directed
links indicate the information flow directions. If two buy-
ers are linked by an one-way arrow edge, it means that the
auction information can only flow in the direction of the ar-
row. For example, the information can flow from buyer D
to buyer G, but not the other way around. This is because G
cannot receive the information from its other neighbors other
than D. Here the diffusion critical sequence of buyer G is
CG = {D,G}. Note that buyers A,B,C,E are not G’s dif-
fusion critical nodes, although they are in the diffusion paths
from the seller toG, because without any of themG can still
receive the information from the other paths. It is also easy
to check that dD = {D,F,G,K} ⊃ dG = {G,K}.
Now we propose our mechanism based on the diffusion
critical sequence.
Definition 9 (Information Diffusion Mechanism (IDM)).
Given the buyers’ action profile a′, for any B ⊆ N−s,
let v∗B = maxi∈B,a′i 6=null v
′
i denote the highest valuation
report among buyers B, let m denote the buyer with the
highest valuation report in a′ (with random tie-breaking),
i.e., v′m = v
∗
N−s . To simplify the representation, let Cm =
{1, 2, · · · , i − 1, i, i + 1, · · · ,m − 1,m} be m’s diffusion
critical sequence.
The allocation policy of the information diffusion mecha-
nism is defined as:
piidmi (a
′) =

1 if i ∈ Cm \ {m} and v′i = v∗−di+1 ,
1 if i = m,
0 otherwise.
(2)
If there exist multiple buyers i with piidmi (a
′) = 1, allocate
the item to the buyer with minimum index i in Cm. Assume
that under the allocation policy, buyer w ∈ Cm wins the
item, the payment policy is defined as:
pidmi (a
′) =

v∗−di − v∗−di+1 if i ∈ Cw \ {w},
v∗−di if i = w,
0 otherwise.
(3)
Intuitively, IDM allocates the item to the first buyer i in
the diffusion critical sequence Cm whose bid is the highest
bid when diffusion critical node i+ 1 does not participate in
the auction. The winner w pays the highest bid without her
participation. Each buyer in Cw \ {w} (winner’s diffusion
critical node) is rewarded the payment increase (not social
welfare increase) due to her diffusion action. In particular,
if i ∈ Cw \ {w} keeps the item by herself, she will pay
something say x, while if she gives it to i+1 and i+1 keeps
it, i + 1 will pay a different amount say y, the difference
y − x is rewarded to i.
Before analyzing the properties of IDM, we show a run-
ning example of IDM by using Figure 2(b). In this setting,
assume that all buyers truthfully report their valuations and
diffuse the information to all their neighbors. It is clear that
L is the buyer with the highest valuation and the diffusion
critical sequence of L is CL = {C, I, L}. According to the
allocation policy, buyer I wins the auction because vI = 12
is the highest valuation when L does not participate in the
auction. Finally, according to the payment policy, buyer I
should pay v∗−dI = 11, and buyerC is rewarded 1 = 11−10.
In what follows, we study the properties of IDM. Follow-
ing the definition of the mechanism, for a given action pro-
file, we classify all buyers into four different status:
1. The winner: w.
2. On-path buyers: all w’s diffusion critical nodes, i.e., Cw \
{w}.
3. Unlucky buyers: if w 6= m, then all dw+1 are unlucky
buyers, otherwise, all dm \ {m} are unlucky buyers.
4. Normal buyers: all buyers who are not classified in any of
the other three status.
According to the payment policy of IDM, once the diffusion
network has been established and Cw has been identified,
only the buyers in Cw (i.e., the winner and the on-path buy-
ers) are involved with non-zero money transfer. Specifically,
for an unlucky buyer i, when w 6= m, we have i ∈ dw+1 and
action a′i cannot change v
∗
−dw+1 . Therefore, v
′
w = v
∗
−dw+1
still holds no matter what a′i is, i.e., buyer w is still the win-
ner and buyer i is still an unlucky buyer for any a′i. Similarly
we can conclude the same when w = m. In other words, the
utility of any unlucky buyer is always zero no matter what
action she takes.
Given the above classifications of buyers, we will prove
that IDM is incentive compatible and individually rational.
To do so, we first prove the following two lemmas. Lemma
2 shows that under IDM a buyer’s payment is independent
of her valuation report.
Lemma 2. For all a′ ∈ A, all i ∈ N−s, pidmi (a′) is inde-
pendent of v′i.
Proof. Firstly, if i is an unlucky buyer or a normal buyer
(i.e., i ∈ N−s \ {Cw}), her utility is zero which is in-
dependent of v′i. Secondly, if i is an on-path buyer (i.e.,
i ∈ Cw\{w}), her payment is v∗−di−v∗−di+1 . Since i /∈ −di,
v∗−di does not depend on v
′
i. Since she is not the winner, we
have v∗−di+1 6= v′i. Therefore, the payment of an on-path
buyer is independent of v′i. Finally, if i is the winner, her
payment is v∗−di . Since i /∈ −di, v∗−di does not depend on
v′i.
Lemma 3 shows that given an action profile, if a buyer
cannot gain any positive utility when she diffuses the infor-
mation to all her neighbors, she will not gain any positive
utility by reducing her diffusion effort.
Lemma 3. Given the buyers’ action profile a′, if i /∈ Cw
under r′i = ri, then i /∈ Cw under any r′i 6= ri.
Proof. If a buyer i is not in Cw, then she can only be an
unlucky buyer or a normal buyer. If i is an unlucky buyer,
we already know that she is still an unlucky buyer no matter
what r′i is. If i is a normal buyer, we have Cm ⊆ −di, i.e.,
Cw (subset of Cm) is independent of r′i. Therefore, a normal
buyer cannot change her status by changing r′i.
Given the above two lemmas, we are ready to show that
IDM is individually rational and incentive compatible.
Theorem 2. The information diffusion mechanism is indi-
vidually rational and incentive compatible.
Proof. Assume that buyer i reports her valuation truthfully.
If she is a normal or an unlucky buyer, her payment is 0 ac-
cording to the payment policy. If she is an on-path buyer, her
utility is ui(ai,a′, (piidm, pidm)) = v∗−di+1 − v∗−di . Since
di ⊃ di+1, we have −di ⊂ −di+1 which leads to the
fact that v∗−di+1 ≥ v∗−di . Therefore for an on-path buyer,
ui(ai,a
′, (piidm, pidm)) ≥ 0. If she is the winner, then her
valuation vi should be identical to the highest bid from buy-
ers set −di+1, which is denoted as v∗−di+1 . Her payment
is v∗−di . Then her utility is v
∗
−di+1 − v∗−di , which is non-
negative. Therefore, for an arbitrary buyer, when she truth-
fully reports her valuation, her utility is nonnegative, IDM is
individually rational.
Now we analyze the action of each kind of buyer in the
social network, and prove that IDM is incentive compatible
(IC). We first prove that, for all kinds of buyers, revealing
the true valuation maximizes their utilities when their action
r′i are determined. Based on Lemma 2, we only need to con-
sider what happens if a buyer i’s bid v′i can affect her status.
Case 1. If i is an unlucky buyer, her utility is always 0
whatever v′i she reports.
Case 2. If i is a normal buyer with a truthful bid, it
means that her valuation is no larger than the highest bid
v′m in the network and she is outside of Cm, leading to
vi ≤ v′m. As long as she bids with v′i ≤ v′m, i cannot
change Cm and she will still be a normal buyer along side
Cm, and her utility is always 0. If v′i > v
′
m, she will change
Cm. Under this circumstance, she will become the winner
but now her utility decreases to vi − v′m ≤ 0. Therefore
for normal buyers, ui(ai, ((vi, r′i),a
′−i), (piidm, pidm)) ≥
ui(ai, ((v
′
i, r
′
i),a
′−i), (piidm, pidm)) for any v′i.
Case 3. If i is an on-path buyer with v′i = vi, then i ∈
Cw \ {w}. According to Eq.(2), we know vi < v∗−di+1 . For
any strategic bid v′i 6= vi < v∗−di+1 , she cannot change Cw
and she is still an on-path buyer. Her utility is still v∗−di+1 −
v∗−di . If she bids with strategic v
′
i ≥ v∗−di+1 , she will be-
come the winner and her utility becomes vi − v∗−di . Since
vi < v
∗
−di+1 , then ui(ai, ((vi, r
′
i),a
′−i), (piidm, pidm)) ≥
ui(ai, ((v
′
i, r
′
i),a
′−i), (piidm, pidm)) for any v′i.
Case 4. If i is the winner with truthful bid, any v′i ≥ vi
will not change the allocation and her utility is vi − v∗−di . If
her bid is v′i < vi, she may still be the winner with utility
vi − v∗−di , or degenerate to an on-path buyer with utility
v2−di+1 − v∗−di where v2−di+1 is the second highest valuation
in −di+1 and v2−di+1 < vi (notice that vi is the original
highest bid in −di+1), or she may degenerate to a normal
buyer with utility 0. In either case, her utility is not higher
than truth-telling.
Therefore, we have ui(ai, ((vi, r′i),a
′−i), (piidm, pidm)) ≥
ui(ai, ((v
′
i, r
′
i),a
′−i), (piidm, pidm)) for all i and all v′i.
Given buyer i’s declared valuation v′i = vi. We then show
that for all kinds of buyers, diffusing the information to all
the neighbors (i.e., r′i = ri) maximizes their utilities.
Case 1. If i is a normal buyer or an unlucky buyer, accord-
ing to Lemma 3, i’s utility is always 0.
Case 2. If i is an on-path buyer, according to the Eq. (3),
her utility is v∗−di+1 − v∗−di . When r′i 6= ri, according to
Lemma 1, di may loss some members. Consequently, she
may still be an on-path buyer. In this case, it’s not hard to
verify that −d(i+1)′ ⊆ −di+1 where (i + 1)′ is the (i +
1)th buyer in new diffusion critical sequence of the highest
bid buyer. Hence, the utility of buyer i may decrease since
v∗−d(i+1)′ ≤ v∗−di+1 . If she degenerates to the winner, then
her utility is vi − v∗−di < v∗−di+1 − v∗−di since vi < v∗−di+1 .
If she degenerates to a normal buyer, her utility becomes 0.
Thus for any on-path buyer i, diffusing the information to all
her neighbors maximizes her utility.
Case 3. If i is the winner, based on Lemma 1,
if r′i 6= ri, di may loss some members. Since
buyer i is with the highest bid in −di+1, therefore
according to allocation policy, i is still the winner
and her utility does not change since −di is not af-
fected. Therefore, ui(ai, ((vi, ri),a′−i), (piidm, pidm)) ≥
ui(ai, ((vi, r
′
i),a
′′−i), (piidm, pidm)) for all i and all r′i.
Putting together the above analysis, we get
that ui(ai, ((vi, ri),a′−i), (piidm, pidm)) ≥
ui(ai, ((v
′
i, r
′
i),a
′′−i), (piidm, pidm)) for all i, all v′i
and all r′i, i.e., IDM is incentive compatible.
As a comparison with the VCG mechanism in social net-
works which may decrease the seller’s revenue and even
leads to a deficit, in the following theorem we prove that
IDM is always weakly budget balanced (non-negative rev-
enue for the seller). More specifically, we show that the rev-
enue of IDM is always above that of the VCG mechanism.
Theorem 3. The information diffusion mechanism is weakly
budget-balanced and its revenue is always greater than or
equal to the revenue of the VCG in social networks.
Proof. According to the payment policy, the seller’s revenue
in IDM is
∑
i∈Cw\{w} (v
∗
−di − v∗−di+1) + v∗−dw = v∗−d1 ,
where buyer 1 is the first buyer in Cw. Since v∗−d1 is non-
negative, then IDM is weakly budget balanced.
In the VCG mechanism, if buyer i /∈ Cm, her payment
is always 0 according to the payment policy. Therefore, the
revenue of the VCG mechanism is only derived from the
payments of buyers in Cm.
RevV CG =
∑
i∈Cm
(W−di(a
′−di)−WN−s\{i}(a′))
=
∑
i∈Cm\{m}
(v∗−di − v∗N−s) + (v∗−dm − 0)
=
∑
i∈Cm\{1}
(v∗−di − v∗N−s) + v∗−d1
≤ v∗−d1 = RevIDM
Therefore the revenue of IDM is always equal or higher than
that of the VCG mechanism.
Moreover, following the proof of Theorem 3, since rs ⊆
−d1 ∪ {1} ⊆ −dw+1, one can easily verify that the revenue
and efficiency of IDM are not less than those of the VCG
mechanism without information diffusion (i.e., the second
price auction involving the seller’s neighbors rs only).
Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we generalized the classical single item auc-
tion into a social network setting, where auction informa-
tion is propagated through the participants in the network
and agents who cannot receive the information will not be
involved in the auction. We proposed mechanisms to incen-
tivize participants to propagate the auction information to
their neighbors and to involve more buyers in the auction
to increase the revenue of the seller. We found that although
the VCG mechanism can be generalized to incentivize infor-
mation diffusion, it will reduce the seller’s revenue. There-
fore, we proposed another novel mechanism to not only in-
centivize information diffusion, but also simultaneously in-
crease the social welfare and the seller’s revenue.
One important future work is the study of social network
based exchanges with multiple items, multiple sellers or
combinatorial valuations such as ad auctions and the sharing
economy platforms. Another interesting feature to consider
in the current setting is the costs of the information propa-
gation to buyers. It is also worth investigating how different
social network structures affect the efficiency and revenue of
our mechanism.
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